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1. Introduction
The concept of cointegration (see e.g., Engle and Granger, 1987; Johansen, 
1988) has been extensively used to model economic equilibrium relationships 
(see e.g., Juselius, 1990; Johansen, 1995; Hubrich, 2001). The links between 
economic and econometric concepts in modelling equilibria are now well under-
stood and are part of the standard tools of empirical analysis. Loosely speaking, 
economic equilibrium relationships have their counterparts in cointegration, or, 
more generally speaking, error correction relationships whose existence can be 
tested and whose parameters can be estimated. The other side of the coin is the 
necessary adjustment back to the equilibrium once it has temporarily been dis-
torted. This adjustment mechanism has also been analysed quite extensively. For 
instance, Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon (1998) and Ericsson (1992) look at 
the implications for inference in cointegrated systems in the presence, or rather 
absence of equilibrium adjustment in one direction or another.
The reactions to deviations from equilibrium have also been interpreted as 
evidence for causality or non-casuality of variables within a system. Applying 
Hosoya and Yuzo’s (1991) strength of causality measure, Granger and Lin 
(1995) show that for nearly integrated systems lack of adjustment to equilibrium 
of one variable can be considered evidence for long run Granger causality of that 
variable for the other one in a bivariate system. The relationship between error 
correction and causality has also become popular in applied research. Among 
others Juselius (1996), Lütkepohl and Wolters (2003) and Juselius and 
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MacDonald (2004) use it to qualify certain variables as causal for other vari-
ables based on the characteristics of the equilibrium correction mechanism.
Looking at vector autoregressive (VAR) models for policy analysis and advice, 
Hendry and Mizon (1998) point out that potential policy instruments must not 
feature error correction behaviour if they are supposed to have a lasting impact. 
Finally, Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000) argue that knowledge about the direc-
tions of error correction yields useful information about large scale VAR model-
ling which would otherwise be haunted by the curse of dimensionality.
This paper focuses on the determination of the adjustment mechanism in 
equilibrium or error correction models. It develops an example of an economic 
model which is fairly general in nature and which can easily be estimated with 
standard econometric tools. It will be shown that under moderate assumptions 
these tools are producing misleading results, i.e. the equilibrium adjustment 
coefficients are estimated with a bias which does not disappear asymptotically. 
This effect is obtained by considering expectations in the data generating proc-
ess. In the light of the above mentioned references this can be considered rather 
bad news since the interpretation of the econometric results would be severely 
misguided.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. After a brief description of the 
problem, empirical examples in Section 3 illustrate the main issues and Section 4 
discusses the results. An informal test is proposed to cope with the issue while a 
rough formal statement of the problem is sketched in the appendix.
2. An Economic Model and the Econometric Approach to It
2.1 The Model
We consider a variable or set of variables y which is a function of another variable 
or set of variables z. The realisations of y and z through time are denoted yt and 
zt respectively. Furthermore, expectations at time t about a value of a variable xt 
at time t + s is denoted Et(xt+s). The relationship between yt and zt is given by
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As usual, L and Δ are the lag and first difference operator respectively with xtL
i = xt−i 
and Δ = 1 − L. The terms 2 11 2 1( ) ,i
p
i n i i i pA L I A L A L A L
+
, , , += − − − −  i = 1,2, 
denote polynomials in the lag operator of length p + 1 at most. Their roots are 
strictly outside the unit circle and the innovations εi,t , i = 1,2 are independent 
multivariate white noise. The (n2 × n1) matrix Λ′ has full column rank n1 with 
1 ≤ n1 ≤ n2, n1,n2 ∈ N.
As I am interested in reasonable forecasts only, it is further assumed that ιt – the 
forecast error – is a stationary variable. With ιt  stationary the expected forecast 
error variance does not increase over time. As a side effect the long–run proper-
ties of the system are exclusively ruled by Φ only.
A situation such as in Equation (1) very often arises in macroeconomic theory. 
For example, the real interest rate (playing the role of yt) is very often considered 
nothing but the sum of the real interest rate plus expected future inflation (this 
sum being zt+s here). Technically, it is easy to see that (1) is a simple augmenta-
tion of the process considered by Engle and Granger (1987) whose system had 
p = s = 0, ι = 0 ∀t, and 
2
.nIΦ =
The following comments seem to be in order. First, the linear relationship 
between yt and zt shall be considered an approximation of the true but probably 
unknown underlying function. The error processes ηi,t, i = 1,2 are approxima-
tions of the (true) structure of the data generating process of yt and zt which is not 
captured by the assumed functional form. This interpretation can be justified by 
the fact that autoregressive processes in general represent useful linear approxima-
tions to a wide range of (possibly also nonlinear) functions. Finally, under rational 
expectations one could consider the additional assumption E(lt+s,zt+s−j) = 0 ∀s > 0, 
j > 0,, which is not needed though for the results below.
Next, the model is transformed into an estimable version. For simplicity we 
first chose s = 1 and generalise the result later on. Define
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1 Note that for 
2n
IΦ = (2) is a cointegrated system and the last columns of α and β would 
vanish.
and write (1) as
 0 1 1t t tA Y AY −= +η ,  (2)
where 
1 2
0l l×  denotes a (l1 × l2) matrix of zeros and Il a l-dimensional identity 
matrix. Pre-multiplying (2) by the inverse of A0 obtains
 
1 21 1
2 22 1
2 22 2
2
1
12
1 0
1
1 1
0 0
0 0  ,
0 0
n nt n n t
n nt n n t t
n nt n n t
t t
y y
z z A
z z
A Y
×× −
−
×+ ×
×× −
∗ ∗
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ΛΦ
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
= Φ + η⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥Φ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
= +η  (3)
In the next step, (3) is transformed into the error correction form by subtracting 
Yt−1 from both sides to arrive at
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The matrix Π can be decomposed into two full column rank matrices α and β 
with
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where 
2
,nIΨ = −Φ  Λ
∗ = ΛΦ2, and Π = αβ′.1 In general, the matrix Π is 
unknown and has to be estimated. Likewise, generally neither α nor β are iden-
tified. Given, however, the identification of β, α can be identified too. The 
Biased Estimation in a Simple Extension of a Standard Error Correction Model 41
2 The lagged dependent variables in (5) are meant to account for the autocorrelation structure 
in ηi,t which is therefore ignored.
identification of β is usually the first and more interesting concern as it can be 
achieved using restrictions arising from economic theory such as the Fisher rela-
tionship or interest parity conditions. In what follows the focus will be on the 
estimation of α conditioning on standard approaches for identifying β. It will be 
demonstrated that some standard econometric technique to handle models like 
(1) by (3) or rather, some derivative of (3) turns out inappropriate.
2.2 The Estimation Approach
The econometric counterpart of (1) can be and usually is set up as an error correc-
tion system. In case of 
2n
IΦ = (1) is a cointegrated system with β′ =(
1n
I : −Λ) as 
the cointegration matrix its rank being n1. The corresponding estimation model 
can be written as
 1
1
d
t t i t i t
i
Y Y Y− −
=
′Δ = αβ + Γ Δ +η∑  (5)
with Yt = (y′t,z′t)′, the (n × n1) coefficient matrices α and β, the (n × n) coeffi-
cient matrices Γi with n = n1 + n2 and p ≤ d, and the (n × 1) vector of innovations 
1 2 2( ) .t t t t s t, , + ,′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′η = η +η Λ +ι Λ ,η
2 In the present context, n1 corresponds to the 
number of cointegrating relationships and n2 is the number of long-run driving 
forces, or the number of stochastic trends in the system. The sum n = n1 + n2 
matches the number of variables in Yt. Putting aside the estimation of the Γi we 
focus on the derivation of the estimates for α. As Granger and Lin (1995) have 
shown the structure of α can be used to make statements about the subset of Yt 
that is driving another subset of Yt in the long run. Note that inference is usually 
only made with respect to zt but not with respect to zt+s even though (3) might 
imply so. The interpretation of zt being Granger causal for yt is nevertheless true 
as is the notion that zt+s is Granger causal for yt.
Letting α1 correspond to yt and α2 to zt conditions 1 and 2 represent neces-
sary (but not sufficient) conditions for model (1) to be congruent with the actual 
observations.
Condition 1: 
2 12
0n n×α =
Condition 2: 
1 11
0n n×α ≠
Estimating (5) should thus yield estimates for α which comply with conditions 
1 and 2. It is noteworthy that the elements of α1 should in general be negative in 
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order to obtain a stationary system. Therefore, condition 2 is rather weak. The 
appendix shows that under pretty reasonable circumstances a clear statement 
about the estimation outcome cannot be made even if the data is generated in 
line with (1). In general, the estimates for α1 and α2 will both be biased upward. 
Two main factors drive the outcome.
Let ˆ 1 2i iα , = ,  denote the ordinary least squares estimator for αi,i = 1,2 when 
Λ is known, ai,i = 1,2 be the probability limit of ˆ( ), 1,2.ii iα − =α  Furthermore, 
the positive semi-definite 
tι
Σ  and the positive definite , 1,2
i t
i
,η
Σ =  matrices be 
the variance–covariance matrices of ιt and , 1,2,i t i,η =  respectively. Assuming 
that model (1) holds, it can be shown that
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The above list implies that the results do not improve if, for example, expecta-
tions approach perfection 
2
( 0  ).t n tι → ∀  Instead, the estimates do not improve but 
worsen. The same holds if the variance in η1,t becomes very large. As an extreme 
case, one could even obtain estimates for α where α1 meets the condition 1 and 
α2 meets condition 2.
This of course is rather bad news. A logical implication is that the presented 
and very widely used empirical approach cannot discriminate between having 
made a mistake when building the model or not. Section 4 proposes a convenient 
albeit not always feasible procedure to identify and circumvent this pitfall.
3. Empirical Examples
The Fisher relation (Fisher, 1930) and the uncovered interest rate parity condi-
tion are popular examples of economic hypotheses with rational expectations, 
among others. In all these cases the objective is to explain the levels of (typically) 
the long-term interest rate. To make the discussion below more handy this paper 
uses the terminology of Granger and Lin (1995) where the weakly exogenous 
variables are referred to as causal in the long–run.
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3.1 The Fisher Relation
The starting point is the notion that rational individuals focus on the real return 
on investments, that is, after accounting for inflation. Therefore, the (long-
term) nominal interest rate ( )lti  needed to convince people to lend money is the 
sum of the desired real return (real interest rate, rt) plus the expected inflation 
( ( )t t sE +π ):
 ( )lt t t t si r E += + π  (6)
The difficulty that arises, is, of course, that expected inflation is not observa-
ble. That’s why in empirical work it is often approximated by the current infla-
tion rate, which would be the best linear forecast if inflation followed a random 
walk, for example.
Therefore, the Fisher hypothesis can be cast in the framework of Section 2 
with lti  being the endogenous variable and πt playing the role of zt.
3.2 The Uncovered Interest Rate Hypothesis
Taking again the perspective of an investor, the portfolio choice will also be made 
considering foreign bonds. If the foreign bond rates are determined exogenously 
(e.g., the U.S. bonds with respect to the rest of the world), then the choice to buy 
or sell domestic bonds will depend on what is expected about the future level of 
the foreign alternative. Again, the role of expectations becomes central and the 
setting of Section 2 applicable.
In all these examples autoregressive processes are commonly used to establish 
a link between the observable values of the exogenous variable and the unobserv-
able expectations about it.
3.3 Estimation Results
The following exercise presents results for the USA, Germany and Switzerland. 
The standard setup is a reduced rank regression as it has been suggested by 
Johansen (1988). In all cases, the choice of variables makes sure that the cointe-
gration rank, as implied by the theory, is exactly one. The test statistic for the 
cointegration rank test is also provided. The general model for estimation is 
(5). The lag order p is chosen according to selection criteria. If the suggested 
lag order is not sufficient to account for residual autocorrelation further lags 
are added. Most of the time, this procedure solves the problem. In one instance 
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(example 1 below), the residual autocorrelation cannot be coped with in the mul-
tivariate setting. Therefore, single equation methods are also used. With these, 
a more flexible lag structure can be implemented that also solves the problem of 
autocorrelation.
Another difficulty with the data is heteroscedasticity and non-normality of 
residuals which can often be observed when modelling interest rates. Here, no 
definite answer can be given. It has not always been possible to eliminate ARCH 
effects and excess kurtosis. All results are presented in Table 1 except for the 
residual properties which are, of course, available on request.
In Table 1, the information regarding the model setup is in columns 1–7. In all 
cases the cointegration rank test supports the hypothetical number of cointegra-
tion relations. In the column labelled “β coefficients”, it is checked whether the 
hypothetical cointegration coefficients can be imposed. These coefficients also 
imply that zt is an unbiased estimate for Et(zt+1). Again, this is the case in almost 
all instances at the 10 percent level of significance. Where this is the case (exam-
ples 1–3), the following test for the restrictions on the adjustment coefficients 
(α) is performed including the restrictions on the β coefficients.
Each of the first lines in the examples 1–6 should, according to the outlines 
above, feature a rejection of the null hypothesis that the respective adjustment 
coefficient is zero. It should be born in mind that this variable is always sup-
posed to represent the independent variable for the long-run relationship in 
economic terms. As expected, the estimation results seem to produce the oppo-
site conclusion, namely that the presumed causal variable significantly reacts to 
deviations from equilibrium while the theoretically endogenous variable (2nd 
line) does not.
For example, in case 1 where the Fisher parity is tested for U.S. data, the 
hypothesis is that inflation expectations rule the nominal interest rates. In the 
econometric model, the expectations are replaced by current inflation which is 
viewed as a predictor of unobservable inflation expectations. Obviously and inde-
pendent of the specific model, the null hypothesis that inflation does not adjust to 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium is strongly rejected. At the same time, 
however, it is found that interest rates do not adjust significantly. While the latter 
statement was found to be true at the 10 percent level only, the situation is much 
clearer in the Swiss case (example 2). Here, the hypothesis that interest rates do 
not adjust cannot be rejected at the 18 percent level.
Example 3 is concerned with the interest rate parity between Germany and 
Switzerland. From the Swiss perspective, Germany is a large economy whose 
bond rates appear exogenous with respect to the Swiss rates. Therefore, the Swiss 
National Bank would be forced to keep an eye on the German rate if too strong 
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Table 1: Empirical Evidence
Cointegration Test β coefficients α coefficients
No. Variablesa Country Sample H 00 LR
b q H 10 LR stat.[prob.] H
2
0 LR stat.
c [prob.] Methodd
Fisher Relation 
1 CPI infl. (β1) USA 89 : 12 − 03:08 rk = 0  22.76 [.02] 5 β1 = −β2 = 1 χ
2(1) = 3.15 [.07] α1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 13.06 [.00] MV
Bond y. (β2) USA T = 161 rk = 1  3.28 [.54] α2 = 0 χ
2(1) = 2.70 [.10]
rk = 0  74.67 [.00] 2 β1 = −β2 = 1 χ
2(1) = 13.98 [.00] α1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 64.38 [.00] MV
rk = 1  3.45 [.51] α2 = 0 χ
2(1) = 2.70 [.10]
α1 = 0 χ
2(1) = 9.5 [.00] SEQ  
α2 = 0 χ
2(1) = 1.94 [.16]
2 CPI infl. (β1) CH 90 : 02 − 03:07 rk = 0  20.50 [.05] 4 β1 = −β2 = 1 χ
2(1) = 1.78 [.18] H 10 ∧ α1 = 0 χ
2(2) = 15.86 [.00] MV
Bond y. (β2) CH T = 158 rk = 1  2.61 [.66] H
1
0 ∧ α2 = 0 χ
2(2) = 3.34 [.18]
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Condition 
3 LIBOR (β1) GER 92 : 01 − 03:07 rk = 0  744.41 [.00] 2 β1 = −β2 = 1 χ
2(1) = 2.73 [.10] H 10 ∧ α1 = 0 χ
2(2) = 13.26 [.00] MV
LIBOR (β2) CH T = 139 rk = 1  6.23 [.18] H
1
0 ∧ α2 = 0 χ
2(2) = 2.80 [.25]
a CPI denotes consumer price index, Bond y. is short for government bond yield, LIBOR is the interest rate for short term credits (3-months) at 
the London interbank market, and Money is the interest rate on one-month interbank credits. More details can be found in Table 3. 
b Likelihood ratio test for the cointegration rank test [Johansen, 1995, tab. 15.2].
c One degree of freedom if no restriction on β-vector imposed, 2 degrees of freedom if H 10 is also imposed (no. 2,3,5–6), 6 degrees of freedom 
(no. 4): H 10  and α1 = α3 = 0 additionally imposed 
d MV abbreviates multivariate model, SEQ single equation model.
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3 Note that theoretically, lagging one variable of the system should not alter the cointegration 
test results. In the empirical example it does so. However, this alterations does not matter 
because in a stationary system – as it is implied by the tests in models number 5 and 6 – the 
framework of Section 2 in principal still holds without the additional complication of non-
stationaritites.
a revaluation of the Swiss Franc versus the Euro (or Deutschmark) is considered 
not desirable. The way to ensure this most efficiently is, of course, to anticipate 
future movements of the German rate. Consequently, even though the German 
rate is the long-run driving force with respect to the Swiss rate, according to the 
model, the adjustment coefficients should seemingly imply the opposite. This is 
actually the case. The hypothesis that German rates do not adjust to Swiss rates 
is very strongly rejected while the hypothesis that Swiss rates do not adjust to 
German rates passes the test.
4. Discussion
4.1 Is There a Cure?
Having described and illustrated the problem, a natural question is of course 
whether there is a cure for it. The most desirable remedy would be an estima-
tion setup where the economic model itself can be tested directly. In the stand-
ard situation, an indirect approach is used because the key element, the expec-
tation about zt, is not observable. Replacing it by an (unbiased) estimator helps 
to circumvent the measurement problem yet incurs the paradox. This point can 
be illustrated by the following additional regression, where the UIP between 
German and Swiss interest rates is used again. This time however, the unobserv-
able expected German rate is approximated by a very good predictor, which is its 
own future realisation. Table 2 has the details.
Obviously, the three months ahead realisation of the German 3-months inter-
est rate is a good guess about the German 3-months interest rates three months 
ahead. A shock to this expectation (now) significantly affects the Swiss interest 
rate while no effect can be measured in the opposite direction. Thus, the para-
dox is solved “econometrically”. In regression 4 of Table 2, the economic and 
econometric notion of dependence and independence finally coincide.3 A cross-
check is provided by example 5, where instead of the German rate, the Swiss 
rate is leading three periods, the outcome however, is qualitatively the same as 
that of model 3.
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Table 2: Empirical Evidence 2nd Step
Cointegration Test β coefficients α coefficients
No. Variablesa Country Sample H 00 LR
b q H 10 LR stat.[prob.] H
2
0 LR stat.
c [prob.] Methodd
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Condition 
4 LIBOR t + 3 (β1) GER 92 : 01 − 03 : 04 rk = 0  25.24 [.00] 3 β1 = −β2 = 1 χ
2(1) = .63 [.43] H 10 ∧ α1 = 0 χ
2(2) = .72 [.70] MV
LIBOR (β2) CH T = 136 rk = 1  11.42 [.02] H
1
0 ∧ α2 = 0 χ
2(2) = 9.39 [.01]
5 LIBOR (β1) GER 92 : 01 − 03 : 04 rk = 0  60.727 [.00] 3 β1 = −β2 = 1 χ
2(1) = 2.56 [.01] H 10 ∧ α1 = 0 χ
2(2) = 39.97 [.00] MV
LIBOR t + 3 (β2) CH T = 136 rk = 1  15.0 [.00] H
1
0 ∧ α2 = 0 χ
2(2) = 2.58 [.27]
6 Moneyt + 3 (β1) CH 89 : 05 − 03 : 04 rk = 0  50.089 [.00] 4 β1 = −β2 = 1 χ
2(1) = 3.82 [.05] α1 = 0 χ
2(2) = 1.70 [.19] MV
LIBOR (β2) CH T = 168 rk = 1  2.64 [.66]  α2 = 0 χ
2(2) = 49.58 [.00]
a CPI denotes consumer price index, Bond y. is short for government bond yield, LIBOR is the interest rate for short term credits (3-months) at 
the London interbank market, and Money is the interest rate on one-month interbank credits. More details can be found in Table 3. 
b Likelihood ratio test for the cointegration rank test [Johansen, 1995, tab. 15.2].
c One degree of freedom if no restriction on β-vector imposed, 2 degrees of freedom if H 10 is also imposed (no. 2,3,5–6), 6 degrees of freedom 
(no. 4): H 10  and α1 = α3 = 0 additionally imposed 
d MV abbreviates multivariate model, SEQ single equation model.
48 Christian Müller
4 Policy simulation and analysis are naturally related concepts, see Hendry and Mizon (1998), 
for example.
5 The test results indicate a good quality of the model such that it can be regarded data 
congruent.
Unfortunately, there are not always good predictors at hand. For example, 
when testing the Fisher parity for long-term bonds, it is not clear how the future 
inflation rates should be weighted in order to produce a good proxy for the infla-
tion in the remaining time to maturity. Similar arguments hold for many other 
relationships.
4.2 Relevance
The literature has so far paid not too much attention to the seemingly surprising 
lack of weak exogeneity of the supposed long-run driving variables. There are, 
however, also good reasons for that. For example, it is of interest in itself if the 
spread between nominal interest rates and inflation is stationary or not, because it 
helps to learn about the Fisher hypothesis. The same holds for the other concepts 
briefly discussed. This inference can be made without reference to the adjustment 
characteristics as long as there is adjustment towards equilibrium at all.
Another stream of literature makes use of the fact that yt needs to be a good pre-
dictor for future zt+s if (1) is the true model. Thus, regressing zt on yt−s (or, rather 
on (zt−s − yt−s ) should yield a significant coefficient and significance would be 
interpreted being consistent with the economic model. This conclusion, however 
clouds the fact that according to (1) variations in zt−s would have to affect yt high-
lighting that the coefficients of such a model are very likely inefficiently estimated 
and more or less useless for economic policy analysis (see Ericson et al., 1998, 
p. 377). The latter is the ultimate goal of many econometric studies, however.
4.2.1 Forecasting and Policy Simulation
Following up on the last point, there are also at least two situations where the dif-
ference matters. The first is forecasting.4 Figure 1 illustrates the effect. Systems 3 
and 4 have been estimated and subjected to standard goodness-of-fit tests such 
as checking for any remaining autocorrelation in the residuals.5 Based on these 
estimated models forecast error shocks can be simulated. This means that one 
equation is shocked once while no shock is allowed in the other equation at the 
same time. This resembles a hypothetical attempt of a policy maker who may 
regard either of the variables as a policy instrument. The corresponding reactions 
of the variables are then graphed.
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Figure 1: Impulse-Responses in Systems 3 and 4.
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6 Note that no statement about significance with respect to the distance from zero is made. 
What matters most, however, is the (principal) difference between the responses in the two 
models.
Obviously, the responses could hardly be more different. In model 3 the reac-
tion of the Swiss rate to a shock in the German rate (lower left panel) dies out 
pretty quickly while in model 4 it remains above two for the whole simulation 
period.6 Likewise striking is the reaction of the German rate in model 3 when 
the Swiss rate is shocked (upper right panel). It appears that the German rate 
responds strongly, while this cannot be observed in model 4.
Therefore, if one bases forecasts for the Swiss interest rate assuming a change in 
the ECB interest rate, for example, on model 3, not only would one obtain results 
which are at odds with conventional wisdom about the relationship between the 
German and Swiss economies, but one would also be diverted from the “true” 
causal links. Considering model 4 instead, solves the puzzle. These opposite 
reactions are a direct result of Hendry and Mizon’s (1998) analysis of instru-
ment–target relationships. They show that weak exogeneity of the instrument 
variable (z in our case) with respect to Λ is a sufficient condition for a long–
run zero response to a shock to the target variable (y in our case). The follow-
ing argument shows that the choice between model 3 and 4 may not need to be 
purely arbitrary.
4.2.2 A Two-Stage-Procedure
A second situation where it may pay to account for the paradox is to test for 
the existence of the paradox itself. For example, for monetary policy analysis it 
would matter if money is causal for inflation or not. If one would assume that the 
demand for money were a function of the expected future price level instead of 
current prices an analysis based on impulse-responses can be severely impaired. 
In such cases rivalling economic models exist which pose causality in opposite 
directions and hence, not taking into account the possibility of biased estimates 
may result in a wrong conclusion. Even worse, since either direction of causal-
ity might be possible and since the αˆ  would in both cases indicate equilibrium 
adjustment, the chance of ever noticing are very low.
In some situations, however, a not too difficult way exists to detect a bias. To 
see this, consider again the model of Section 2. If it was possible to replace the 
approximation of the expected value by the expectation itself, then the standard 
situation as of, e.g. Engle and Granger (1987), Hendry and Mizon (1998), 
Ericsson et al. (1998) arises. In terms of the stylised situation of Section 2, this 
Biased Estimation in a Simple Extension of a Standard Error Correction Model 51
7 The expression plim denotes the probability limit. Of course, the value of α1 is strictly speak-
ing a function of A1(L) and A2(L). For the purpose of demonstration it is relevant to note that 
it will not be zero.
results in estimates for α1 and α2 ( 1αˆ  and 2ˆ ,α  respectively) which are in accord-
ance with the conditions 1 and 2.
The crucial point is that now 2αˆ  will be zero if forecasts are nearly perfect. 
We now also obtain 1 1ˆplim( ) .= αα
7 Thus, the economically sensible result is 
obtained which implies that zt drives yt in the long-run but not vice versa. There-
fore, a two-step procedure can be proposed. First, the standard cointegration 
analysis is performed and the weak exogeneity properties are determined (see 
models 3). Then, the set of weakly exogenous variables, zt, is replaced by its best 
possible s-step ahead forecast (which, e.g., could be zt+s) and the analysis repeated 
(see models 4). If the results are identical to the ones obtained in the first step, one 
would be re-assured, that the underlying structural dependence, is as it appears 
to be from the face values of the estimates. If, however, some variables are now 
found to belong to the set yt which in step 1 have been found belonging to zt, then 
the true relationship is likely to be of the type sketched in Section 2.
Unfortunately, it is not always clear what the best possible forecast is. In the 
Fisher relationship, expected inflation is certainly not the inflation rate of a spe-
cific month in the future, but some “overall” future price change. That difficulty 
of course limits the potential for obtaining useful test results. The estimation 
result of models 3 versus 4 may represent examples where the two-step proce-
dure proved useful, however.
5. Conclusion
In economic models where expectations about one variable rule the behaviour 
of another one the standard econometric approach is not very likely to reveal 
the true causal links if the expectations cannot be directly observed. This paper 
has shown that this result also holds for cointegrated relationships where the 
direction of adjustment towards the equilibrium is used to identify the long run 
dependent and independent variables. Moreover, a paradox may arise in which 
the true links are more likely recovered if the underlying economic model is in 
fact built on poor grounds. Therefore, when it comes to interpreting the adjust-
ment coefficients, for example by impulse–response analysis one has to be par-
ticularly careful.
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Various data examples using popular economic hypotheses have illustrated 
these considerations. The bias is especially relevant for forecasting and policy 
simulation. Under some circumstances, however, a simple cure for the paradox 
exists which also has the potential for testing for the true causal relations.
Appendix
A. From the Economic to the Econometric Approach
A.1 Step 1 – The Standard Regression
The model will first be re-stated and then the estimation of α will be discussed.
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In the standard estimation approach the second line is usually disregarded and 
inference is only made with respect to the first and last line of α as well as the 
first line of β′. For simplicity it is assumed that the matrix β can be super consist-
ently estimated (e.g. in cointegrated systems), or that the economic prior regard-
ing Λ is so strong that it need not be estimated at all. Then, the central casual-
ity analysis is with respect to α alone. Let’s write
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Estimation of the first and third row will be called the first step regression. The 
estimates for α1,1 and α3,1 would then be used for causality interpretation. Find-
ing them to correspond to a nonzero (α1,1) matrix and to a zero (α3,1) matrix 
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8 Note that stationarity of the forecast error is part of the necessary conditions for writing (1) 
as a cointegrated system.
respectively would yield the correct interpretation, namely that in the long run 
causality is running from z to y but not vice versa. Let
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and obtain the regression model tY X η= α +  with ordinary least squares 
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The following definitions help to simplify the representation. Assume that the 
model is constant over time and that the innovations ηi,t, i = 1,2 as well as the 
forecast error, ιt has time invariant first and second moments.
8 We then let for a 
covariance stationary stochastic variable W = (w1,w2,…, wt )
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9 For s = 0 the subscript will be omitted.
be the probability limit for the covariance estimator of the covariance between wt 
and wt+s.
9 Furthermore we may note that , | , 1 2
s j s jw w
s j …
− +
Σ = Σ | | |= , ,  Similar 
arguments hold for wt and another covariance stationary stochastic variable τt:
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The asymptotic OLS biases are given as 
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Both factors on the right hand side involve the term ΛΣιΛ′ which implies that 
a1 cannot be assumed to turn out zero. In fact, since ΛΣιΛ′  is positive semi-
definite under reasonable circumstances there is a tendency for the 1,1αˆ  to be 
biased upward. Hence, it will in general not be informative about the true causal 
links.
Turning to a3, we find
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To interpret z to not depend on y the estimate of 3,1αˆ  should be a matrix of zeros. 
This again will generally not be the case. The reason is the term
 22
φη η
Σ

in the first factor on the right hand side which is not going to be zero even if the 
remaining matrix expressions which involve cross covariances might do. Moreo-
ver, it would not even help to find ιt = 0, ∀t (perfect forecasts). In that situation 
the most reasonable effect would be an even larger bias since the ‘denominator’, 
(XX ′/T ), would be ‘smaller’ and hence the bias would not be reduced as much as 
it is due to ΛΣιΛ′ for non-zero forecast errors. On the other hand, if the forecast 
error had a huge variance in comparison to the innovations in ηi the bias would 
disappear. This effect gives rise to what has been called ‘good forecast bias’. Simi-
larly, for very large 
1η
Σ  implying that the economic model does not make much 
sense, the bias would also disappear. Therefore, the true causal links between y 
and z will be obtained only if the underlying economic model is poor as defined 
in the main text.
A.2 Step 2 – The Complementary Regression
The standard regression approach appeared to produce unreliable or even totally 
misleading results with respect to the coefficients of interest. Therefore, a com-
plementary regression has been suggested in Section 4. Consider
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Pre-multiplying with the inverse of 0A  and subtracting Yt−1 from both sides 
gives
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which reproduces the triangular structure seen before and which ensures that the 
economic and Granger causality coincide also in this partial model. The decom-
position of the matrix in front of the lagged right hand side variables follows the 
lines above and the coefficient of interest will be called α1,1 and α2,1 respectively. 
The new regressor, X , is now given by
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which can be simplified to yield
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the application. Furthermore, the biases 1,a  2a  for the estimates α1,1 and α2,1 
are now
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Again, one might look at the special case for 
2
.nIΦ =  We then have
Biased Estimation in a Simple Extension of a Standard Error Correction Model 57
10 Independent of Φ the ‘numerators’ now only contain cross terms which would vanish if zero 
correlation between η1,t and η2,r for all r and t is assumed and if the corellation between η1,t , 
η1,t , ιt , and ιr is zero for all r ≠ t.
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It is thus straightforward to see that for smaller forecast errors 
2 1
( 0 ),t n ×ι ≈ 2a  will 
be closer to zero than otherwise. The same holds for small variations in η1,t. 
Under the same conditions 11ˆ ,α  will approach α1,1.
10 Thus, the better the eco-
nomic model, the higher is the chance that the true causal links will be revealed. 
However, it is not known a priori, if one finds herself or himself in the standard 
regression or in the complementary regression. That’s why the following proce-
dure can be suggested.
1. Run a regression as in the standard case.
2. Lead the set of regressors which do not turn out weakly exogenous to the most 
likely period for which expectations of these variables may count for the weakly 
exogenous variables.
3. Run the complementary regression.
4. If the same set of variables turns out weakly exogenous as before they can be 
considered the driving variables.
5. If the set of variables that has previously been found to be endogenous turns 
out weakly exogenous, lead the weakly exogenous variables of the first step 
appropriately and run another regression.
6. If the set of variables turning out weakly exogenous is the same as in step 2, 
then they can be considered the driving variables
Otherwise no set of variables can be labelled causal. The number 5 of the pro-
cedure above could be regarded a third step regression, but in fact it is merely 
a confirmation of the correct choice and could also be omitted. In Table 2 the 
results for this third regression are reported in Section 6.
58 Christian Müller
A.3 Generalisation for s ≥ 1
So far, s has been restricted to equal 1. It is easy to see however, that the results 
can be generalised to any value of s. Consider
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Then replace Λ by Λ+, Φ by Φ+, yt by ty  and zt by tz  in (1) and the analysis 
goes through.
B. Data Sources
Table 3. Data Descriptions and Data Sources
Model Item / description Code Source  
(Table 1) 
1 CPI inf l.: 1200-fold log of 1st dif-
ference of Consumer price index, all 
items less food and energy Base Period: 
1982–84=100, seasonally adjusted with 
X12Arima 
CUUR0000SA0L1E USA, bureau of 
labor statistics (BLS) 
Bond y.: Rate of interest in money and 
capital markets, Federal Government 
securities, Constant maturity Ten-years 
Federal Reserve 
System (FED)  
2 CPI infl.: Switzerland, 1200-fold log of 
1st difference of Consumer price index, 
all items Base Period: May 1993=100, 
seasonally adjusted 
TS11515102 Switzerland, Federal 
Bureau of Statistics 
Bond y.: Switzerland, Rate of interest in 
Federal Government securities, Constant 
maturity Ten-years 
Swiss National Bank 
(SNB), Monthly 
Bulletin (MB) 
08/2003, Table E3  
3 LIBOR: Germany, Money Market Rate, 
3 months 
SU0107 Bundesbank, MB 
08/2003  
LIBOR: Switzerland, Money Market 
Rate, 3 months 
SNB, MB 08/2003 
4 Bond y.: USA see Model 1 
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Model Item / description Code Source  
(Table 1) 
Bond y.: Japan, Government Bond 
Yield 
M.15861…ZF… International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) 
LIBOR: USA Eurodollar deposits, Pri-
mary market, three-month maturity 
FED  
LIBOR: Japan, 3-MONTH LIBOR: 
Offer London 
M.15860EA.ZF… IMF 
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SUMMARY
This paper considers an expectations augmented version of the Engle and 
Granger (1987) error correction model and shows that standard inference about 
the adjustment coefficients can be severely biased. This bias has implications 
for long–run causality and impulse–response analysis in particular. However, 
a sometimes simple remedy exists which only requires some additional regres-
sions. The results are illustrated with popular macroeconomic relationships like 
the Fisher relation and uncovered interest parity hypothesis using U.S., German 
and Swiss data.
